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Abstract. In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage re-
nal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors
among each other. National kidney exchange programmes are in opera-
tion in ten European countries, and some of them have already conducted
international exchanges through regulated collaborations. The exchanges
are selected by conducting regular matching runs (typically every three
months) according to well-defined constraints and optimisation criteria,
which may differ across countries. In this work we give integer program-
ming formulations for solving international kidney exchange problems,
where the optimisation goals and constraints may be different in the
participating countries and various feasibility criteria may apply for the
international cycles and chains. We also conduct simulations showing the
long-run effects of international collaborations for different pools and un-
der various national restrictions and objectives.
Keywords: integer programming · kidney exchanges · simulations.
1 Introduction
When an end-stage kidney patient has a willing, but incompatible living donor,
then in many countries this patient can exchange his/her donor for a compatible
one in a so-called kidney exchange programme (KEP). The first national kidney
exchange programme was established in 2004 in the Netherlands in Europe [9].
Currently there are ten countries with operating programmes in Europe [6], the
largest being the UK programme [11].
Typically the matching runs are conducted in every three months on pools
with around 50-300 patient-donor pairs. The so-called virtual compatibility graph
represents the patient-donor pairs with nodes and an arc represents a possible
donation between the corresponding donor and patient, that is found compati-
ble in a virtual crossmatch test. The exchange cycles are selected by well-defined
optimisation rules, that can vary across countries. The most important con-
straints are the upper limits on the length of exchange cycles, for examples, two
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in France, three in the UK and Spain, and four in the Netherlands [6]. The main
goal of the optimisation in Europe is to facilitate as many transplants as possi-
ble, i.e. to maximise the number of nodes covered in the compatibility graph by
independent cycles. The corresponding computational problem for cycle-length
limits three or more is NP-hard, and the standard solution technique used is
integer programming [1].
International kidney exchanges have already started in Europe between Aus-
tria and Czech Republic [7] since 2016, between Portugal, Spain and Italy since
summer 2018, and between Sweden, Norway and Denmark in the Scandiatrans-
plant programme (STEP), built on the Swedish initiative [2]. The above men-
tioned first two collaborations are organised in a sequential fashion, first the
national runs are conducted and then the international exchanges are sought for
the remaining patient-donor pairs. A related game-theoretical model has been
studied in [8]. In the Scandinavian programme, however, the protocol proposed
is to find an overall optimum for the joint pool. In the latter situation, the
fairness of the solution for the countries involved can be seen as an important
requirement, which was studied in [10] with extensive long-term simulations by
proposing the usage of a compensation scheme among the countries. 5
In this study we will compare the sequential and the joint pool scenarios in
our simulations. We will not consider compensations, or any strategic issues, but
we will allow the countries to have different constraints and goals with regard
to the cycles and chains they may be involved in. In particular, we will compare
the benefits of the countries from international collaborations when they have
different upper bounds on their national cycles, and thus also possible different
constraints on the segments of the international cycles they are participating
in. As an example, we mention the Austro-Czech cooperation, where Austria re-
quires on having all exchanges simultaneously, so they allow short national cycles
and short segments only, whilst in Czech Republic the longer non-simultaneous
cycles and chains are also allowed. We formulate novel IP models for dealing
with potentially diverse constraints and goals in international kidney exchange
programmes and we test two-country cooperations under different assumptions
over their constraints, the possibility of having chains triggered by altruistic
donors, and the sizes and compositions of their pools.
2 Model of international kidney exchanges
In a standard kidney exchange problem, we are given a directed compatibility
graph D(V,A), where the nodes V = {1, 2, . . . n} correspond to patient-donor
pairs and there is an arc (i, j) if the donor of pair i is compatible with the
patient of pair j. Furthermore we have a non-negative weight function w on the
arcs, where wi,j denotes the weight of arc (i, j), representing the value of the
transplantation. (In most applications the primary concern is to save as many
patients as possible, so the value is simply equal to one.)
5 Similar situation arises in the US kidney exchange problem, where the transplant
centres are the strategic agents [4, 5, 3, 13].
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Let C denote the set of cycles allowed in D, which are typically to be of
length at most K. The solution of a classical kidney exchange problem is a set
of disjoint cycles of C, i.e. a cycle-packing in D. For cycle c ∈ C, let A(c) denote
the set of arcs in c and V (c) denote the set of nodes covered by c.6
In an international kidney exchange programme multiple countries (N) are
involved in the exchange, so the set of nodes is partitioned into V = V 1 ∪
V 2 ∪ · · · ∪ V N , where V k is the set of patient-donor pairs in country k. We
have the following modifications of the classical problem. Let Ak denote the
arcs pointing to V k (so the donations to patients in country k). Note that A =
A1∪A2∪· · ·∪AN . The weights of the arcs in Ak should reflect the preferences of
country k. (We may assume that these are scaled, e.g. by having the same average
score in order not to bias the overall optimal solution towards some countries.)
Finally, let AN and AI denote the national and international donations, i.e.
A = AN ∪AI .
In a global optimal solution, small cycles within the countries can have differ-
ent requirement than international cycles. Therefore, we separate the two sets of
cycles into C = CN ∪CI , where CN is the set of national cycles and CI is the set
of international cycles. We call the national parts of an international cycle seg-
ments, where a segment is a path within a country, and the segments are linked
by international arcs. A l-segment is a path of length l − 1, with all the l nodes
belonging to the same country. Let S denote the set of all possible segments,
and let Sk denote the set of segments allowed in country k. For s ∈ S, let A(s)
denote the set of (national) arcs and let V (s) denote the set of nodes covered
(in the same country). Note that a segment may also consist of a single node,
which corresponds to the case when an international donation is immediately
followed by another international donation. We can have the following natural
restrictions on the national and international cycles:7
1. different limits on the length of national cycles for each country;
2. different limits on the length of segments in international cycles for each
country;
3. limit on the total length of an international cycle;
4. limit on the number of countries involved in one cycle;
5. limit on the number of patient-donor pairs from a country in one cycle;
6. limit on the number of segments in a country within one cycle.
6 In addition, we can also consider altruistic donors, in which case we separate the
node set into patient-donor pairs Vp and altruistic donors Va, so V = Vp ∪ Va. The
solution may contain exchange cycles and chains triggered by altruistic donors. The
latter can be conducted non-simultaneously, so different restrictions may apply for
them. In this paper we focus on cycles, but we note that one can reduce the problem
of finding chains to the problem of finding cycles by adding artificial patients to the
altruistic donors, who are compatible with all donors.
7 We can also have different constraints for altruistic chains, and we may require that
an international chain may have to end in the same country where it started.
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Integer programming formulations and simulation plan: We propose
new integer programming formulations, where besides the standard edge- and
cycle-formulations [1], we introduce new variables for country segments. We defer
this part, together with the description of the simulation plan, to the journal
version of the paper. Below we only present one simulation.
3 A simulation example
To determine the benefits of international kidney exchange programmes (KEPs)
we conducted a case study involving two countries which aim to develop a joint
KEP and are concerned about the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation
between their KEPs. We compare the individual benefits from the no cooperation
case to the sequential matchings and merged pool scenarios.
The simulation involves 20 instances each containing the compatibility infor-
mation for 1000 patient-donor pairs. We assume that an extra 10% of this amount
are altruist donors. The length of the considered time-frame in the simulated kid-
ney exchange schemes is 5 years with matching runs occurring every 3 months
for each instance, as in [12]. Each agent is assigned an uniformly distributed
arrival time, and the patient-donor pairs stay in the KEP for a maximum of 1
year (or 4 matching runs) after which they leave the programme (which means
that they opt for an alternative solution, such as having a direct transplant after
desensitisation or getting an organ from a deceased donor).
Fig. 1. Graphic representation of the first KEP stage in one of the instances: altruist
donors are at the top, patient-donor pairs form circles for each country and arcs repre-
sent transplants. Left side, individual KEPs: 13/16 patients receive transplants in the
small country, 28/38 patients in the large country are transplanted. Right side, merged
KEP: the numbers are 15/16 for the small country, and 32/38 for the large one.
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In the illustrative simulation we have two countries. Country 1 is twice the
size of Country 2, meaning that it will have roughly twice as many patient-donor
pairs, as well as altruist donors. On average, each month will mean the arrival
of 33.33 patients to Country 1 and 16.66 to Country 2. Country 2 runs a smaller
programme and allows only 2-cycles and 3-chains, while country 1 allows for
3-cycles and 4-chains. When they collaborate, they allow international 2-cycles,
international 3-cycles where there is only one patient-donor pair involved from
Country 2 and chains that must end in the same country where the altruist
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donor is coming from. The objective is simply to maximise the number of trans-
plants. There are three settings for collaboration: no cooperation (i.e. separate
KEPs, baseline scenario), sequential matchings (each country runs a local KEP
optimisation and then the remaining patient pools enter a joint KEP) and full
collaboration (a single KEP for both countries). We present our findings in Fig.
1, Fig. 2 and Table 1.
Fig. 2. Average across 20 instances of transplants and
dropouts from the KEP recorded after each of the 20 stages
of the KEP.
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Table 1. Average total
transplants (tr.) and to-
tal patients who drop out
(d.o.) of the programme
across all 20 instances af-
ter 5 years.
tr. d.o.
C1 local 600.2 42.15
C2 local 199.45 90.2
C1 seq. 611.45 36.35
C2 seq. 214.85 78.35
C1 joint 618.7 30.85
C2 joint 289.7 22.15
We observe firstly that the size of the KEP donor pool is important to increase
the number of compatible transplants: the smaller country struggles with a lower
rate of transplants than the larger one, and has a significant 31% drop out rate.
While the larger country does not see much benefit from entering a joining KEP
with the smaller country, we can observe that its number of transplants does
not decrease when international collaboration increases. However, the smaller
country benefits greatly, especially in the case of merged KEPs, where the drop
out rate is significantly lowered to about 7%, a value similar to the drop out
rate of the single larger country’s individual KEP scenario. This information
suggests that newly developing and smaller KEPs have much to gain from full
collaboration with a larger KEP. On the other hand, the improvement in the
sequential KEP scenario is much less than that of the fully joint KEP for the
smaller country.
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